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Abstract. This paper presents an empirical examination on the role of framing 
as a persuasion technique in agent-to-human negotiations. The primary 
hypothesis was that when a software agent frames the same offer in different 
ways it will have different consequences for a human counterpart’s perceptions 
of the negotiation process and outcomes. A secondary hypothesis was that the 
subjective effectiveness of different frames will be influenced by the 
personality of the human counterpart. An experiment to test these hypotheses 
was conducted using a simulated software seller agent and a human buyer 
counterpart in a 4-issue negotiation task. The results demonstrated the influence 
of framing on human counterparts’ judgments of subjective effectiveness–an 
influence that was moderated by the personality variable Need for Cognition. 
The findings illustrate the strategic impact of framing and personality on 
satisfaction in negotiation, suggesting that these variables should be taken into 
account in designing negotiating agents.  
Keywords: frame, negotiation, satisfaction, personality, Need for Cognition, 
persuasion, agent-to-human negotiation, automated negotiation, experiment 
1   Introduction 
Recently, spurred no doubt by the rapid growth of the electronic marketplace, there 
has been increasing interest in applying AI techniques to the design of autonomous 
agents that serve as surrogates for human decision-makers. Previous research in the 
agent-based negotiation community has explored persuasion techniques for 
argumentation-based protocols in which agents accompanied their offers with their 
underlying reasons in agent-to-agent negotiation settings [1, 2]. However, relatively 
little is known about the dynamics of argumentation and persuasion in agent-to-
human negotiation contexts [3]. 
In an open, e-market environment, a software agent acting on behalf of its principal 
might have to negotiate with another software agent, or with a human agent. In the 
latter case, wherein a software agent negotiates with a human agent, it might be 
helpful for the software agent to be equipped not only with sophisticated intelligence, 
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 but also with the kind of artful skills that enable strategically advantageous 
interactions [3, 4]. Thus agent-to-human negotiation creates a new and interesting 
area for research–one which bridges the gap between how negotiation is performed in 
human and in artificial worlds.  
An important aspect of negotiation dynamics that social scientists who study 
cognitive processes, decision making, persuasion, and communication have studied is 
framing–a persuasion technique widely used in human-to-human communication. In 
decision theory terms, a frame refers to a “decision-maker’s conception of the acts, 
outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice” [5] (p. 453). The 
(software) agent-to-human negotiation context allows the examination of framing not 
only in terms of its economic, utility-based, effects but also in terms of its subjective 
consequences for human negotiation counterparts, and it is this aspect of framing that 
is the primary focus of this paper. Simply put, we explore the impact of different 
message frames on subjective effectiveness, defined as the extent to which an 
individual perceives positive psychological experiences in a negotiation situation [6]. 
Recent social psychological research suggests that there are four underlying 
dimensions in terms of which the subjective outcomes of a negotiation can be 
characterized: Feelings about the self, Feelings about the instrumental outcome, 
Feelings about the process, and Feelings about the relationship [7]. Such 
psychological perceptions are associated with long-term consequences such as 
willingness to interact with the same counterpart in future [6, 7]. Prior research has 
established that when the same information (logically speaking) is presented using 
different frames, the emotions people experience depend on whether they tend to 
focus on their aspirations or their obligations (i.e., on their regulatory focus) as they 
pursue their goals [8]. This raises the possibility that the differential impact of gain 
and loss frames might extend to different people’s psychological perceptions in 
different ways. Another respect in which individuals might differ in how they respond 
to different message frames relates to their motivation to process the information. In 
the present study, when manipulating message frames, the economic utility of the 
offer is kept constant, so the messages do not differ in their substantive content. 
Differences in people’s motivation to process information is captured by the Need for 
Cognition personality variable, the measurement scale for which assesses the 
tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activity, or thinking [9]. In 
summary, we address the following two questions: 
1. When a negotiating agent presents an offer to its human counterpart, how do 
different message frames (of the same offer) affect the counterpart’s subjective 
evaluations of the negotiation process and outcome? 
2. Do aspects of the human counterpart’s personality moderate any such effects? 
2 Message Frames  
Among various types of message frames examined in the persuasion literature (e.g., 
image-focused versus quality-focused frames [10], affective versus cognitive frames 
[11]), one of the most extensively studied framing strategies are gain and loss frames 
[12]. Gain frames focus on the benefits of taking action whereas loss frames focus on 
 the costs of failing to take action, both relative to the same desired state of affairs 
(e.g., [13]). For example, relative to the desired state of good cardiac health, a typical 
gain frame focuses on the potential beneficial outcome of having a healthy heart 
resulting from action: “If you follow this diet, you will have a healthy heart”. In 
contrast, a typical loss frame focuses on the potential costly outcome of getting heart 
disease resulting from inaction: “If you don’t follow this diet, you will get heart 
disease”. Note that in these examples, the gain and loss frames are isomorphic with 
engaging and not engaging in action. The frames focus only on the presence of a gain 
or a loss–action for the gain, inaction for the loss. 
However, it is also possible to consider frames that focus on the absence of gains 
(i.e., non-gains) and the absence of losses (i.e., non-losses). Continuing with the 
example of good cardiac health, a non-gain frame would be “If you don’t follow this 
diet, you will not have a healthy heart,” while the corresponding non-loss frame 
would be “If you follow this diet, you will not get heart disease.” Table 1 illustrates 
the possible frames that can occur when the absence/presence dimension is crossed 
with the gain/loss dimension. 
Table 1.  Example of gain/loss frames crossed with presence/absence  
 Presence Absence 
Gain Gain 
If you follow this diet, you 
will have a healthy heart. 
Non-gain 
If you don’t follow this diet, you 
will not have a healthy heart. 
Loss Loss 
If you don’t follow this diet, you 
will get heart disease. 
Non-Loss 
If you follow this diet, you 
will not get heart disease. 
 
Framing has been studied extensively with respect to how it affects people’s 
behavior and their perceptions, especially their perceptions of risk. For example, an 
important finding resulting from Prospect Theory [14] indicates that people are more 
risk-averse when a decision problem is framed as a possible gain, and more risk-
tolerant when it is framed as a possible loss. In general, many studies suggest that 
people tend to respond differently when presented with the possibility of gaining 
something as opposed to not losing something, or losing as opposed to not gaining 
something (e.g., [15]). Compared to conditions when outcomes are framed as losses 
or non-gains, negotiators tend to make fewer concessions and reach fewer agreements 
when outcomes are framed as gains or non-losses [16]. However, a recent meta-
analysis [12] of 165 cases involving a total of more than 50,000 participants revealed 
that overall, loss frames were no more persuasive than gain frames.  
Our work differs from existing research in two important respects. First, in the 
meta-analysis [12], gain frames and non-loss frames were classified together as gain 
frames, and loss and non-gain frames were classified together as loss frames. It is 
possible that these conflations (necessitated by the studies included in the analysis) 
mask differences that might have been found had gain and non-loss frames, and loss 
and non-gain frames been separated. In the present work, we considered both the 
absence-presence distinction and the gain-loss distinction. Second, disagreements 
about the effectiveness of frames basically revolve around the question of whether 
frames affect behavioral compliance or attitudes toward the recommended behavior. 
 However, our interest is in the subjective effectiveness of framing in negotiation, so 
our focus is on participants’ perceptions toward the negotiation settlement, the 
counterpart, and the self. 
An important subjective outcome of a negotiation is the negotiator’s judgment 
about the faithfulness, friendliness, and flexibility of the other [6, 7]. When we apply 
the four distinctive frames in negotiation context, the gain and non-loss frames can be 
thought of as corresponding to a “promise” message whereas the loss and non-gain 
frames communicate a kind of “threat”. Threats and promises are conditional 
commitments by the sender to do desirable or undesirable things for the message 
recipient as a function of the recipient’s response [17-19].  In our context, when the 
final offer is presented as “if you don’t accept my offer, I won’t give you the free 
service-upgrade” (non-gain) or “if you don’t accept my offer, I‘ll charge you for the 
service-upgrade” (loss), the offer has the form of a threat. This contrasts with offers in 
the form of promises, as in “if you accept my offer, I will give you a free service-
upgrade” (gain) and “if you accept my offer, I won’t charge you a free service-
upgrade” (non-loss). It is easy to imagine that threats would elicit in the message 
receiver negative perceptions (e.g., of aggressiveness) of the message sender [20]. 
Research has suggested that threats that are more compellent [21], or that are 
associated with greater clarity [22, 23], or that can be presented in early-explicit or 
late-implicit manners [24] tend to be perceived more aggressive than otherwise. 
Therefore, when negotiators feel threatened, they are more likely to develop an 
aggressive/negative impression of the message sender, whereas they are more likely 
to experience more positive feelings towards the counterpart when the message is 
framed as a promise.  
The various considerations discussed above, lead to the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Negotiators are more likely to feel satisfied with respect to their 
counterparts when they accept offers with “promise” frames (gain/non-loss frames), 
than when they accept offers with “threat” frames (loss/non-gain frames).  
In addition to considering how a negotiator feels about the other party, he or she is 
also likely to have feelings about the settlement per se. In fact, satisfaction with the 
settlement is the subjective outcome most usually evaluated in computer-supported 
negotiation experiments (e.g., [25-29]). Satisfaction with the settlement relates 
primarily to the subjective belief that a negotiator has achieved a fair, desirable, 
and/or efficient solution. We know from previous studies [e.g., 30, 31] that 
negotiators are more willing to make concessions when presented with a gain frame 
than with a loss frame. It is reasonable to suppose that the way in which a concession 
is made will influence other subjective perceptions such as feelings about the 
settlement and about oneself. That is, the subjective sense that one conceded 
voluntarily as opposed to having been pressured to concede might lead to a greater 
sense of satisfaction with the settlement, even though the objective outcomes don’t 
differ–hence, the second hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2. Negotiators are more likely to feel satisfied with respect to their 
settlements when they accept offers with “promise” frames (gain/non-loss frames), 
than when they accept offers with “threat” frames (loss/non-gain frames). 
 3 The Moderating Role of Personality  
The subjective effectiveness of a negotiation framed with gain, non-loss, non-gain, 
and loss frames is likely to be complicated by aspects of the recipient’s cognitive-
processing patterns. One interesting example of such processing patterns or styles is 
illustrated by recent research suggesting that processing negation, which involves 
higher order rule-based processes, is more cognitively demanding than processing 
material that does not involve negation [32]. Since offers presented with non-gain or 
non-loss frames involve negation, they require more cognitive effort to process than 
offers presented with gain or loss frames. This gives rise to (at least) two interesting 
possibilities. First, people might be insensitive to non-gain and non-loss frames. 
Therefore, the subjective effectiveness of a non-gain frame would be lower than that 
of a gain frame (but still higher than that of a loss frame), whereas the subjective 
effectiveness of a non-loss frame would actually be higher than that of a loss frame 
(but still lower than that of a gain frame). Another possibility is that people might be 
put off by the cognitive demands of non-gain or non-loss frames such that the 
subjective effectiveness of a non-gain frame would not only be lower than a gain 
frame but also a loss frame, with the same pattern observed for a non-loss frame.  
Therefore, the effect of framing on the subjective evaluations of a negotiation might 
well be moderated by the personality of the offer recipient, a possibility that we 
explore in terms of Need for Cognition.  
The Need for Cognition (NC) personality variable characterizes an individual’s 
chronic tendency to take on and enjoy effortful cognitive activities. People who are 
high in NC typically show an orientation toward mental challenges [33]. For instance, 
a high NC individual is more likely to have a positive attitude toward tasks that 
involve reasoning or problem solving, and which require considerable use of 
cognitive resources. Conversely, individuals who are low in NC are more dependent 
on heuristics (i.e., cognitive “short cuts”), external source (e.g., experts), or other 
processes which serve to simplify or reduce information processing. Such individuals 
prefer tasks that are relatively simple and which take less toll on their cognitive 
resources [14]. The role of NC in social psychological processes has been examined 
extensively in the psychology literature, with studies typically assessing NC using 
Cacioppo and Petty’s Need for Cognition Scale [9]. This measure has demonstrated 
good reliability and the ability to predict a variety of outcomes in combination with 
other factors, and has revealed reliable differences not only in self-reported 
motivation but also in actual processing behavior [34]. 
In persuasion research, NC has been found to interact with the argument quality of 
persuasive messages to predict attitude change. In general, individuals high in NC 
distinguish strong and weak arguments to a greater extent than do those low in NC 
(e.g., [35-37]). On the other hand, individuals with low NC have also been found to 
differentiate source factors such as source attractiveness and perceived honesty more 
than those with high NC [36, 38]. Persistence of attitudes over time has also been 
found for those high but not low in NC [36, 39]. In the negotiation context, where 
information takes the form of negotiators’ offers, we expect differences in 
negotiators’ NC to result in different perceptions of the bargaining situation, and 
consequently, their attitude towards the process and outcome of the negotiation.  
 Individuals high in NC have a natural inclination to process information to a 
greater extent, therefore they are likely to experience more positivity when accepting 
an offer presented with a relatively complex frame compared to individuals low in 
NC. As mentioned above, processing negation, as is required for non-gain or non-loss 
frames requires more cognitive resources [32], so it might be that individuals high in 
NC are more satisfied (or less dissatisfied) with the negotiation process and outcome 
when presented with non-loss/non-gain offers because such offers appear more 
mentally challenging to process. More importantly, high NC individuals would have a 
more positive experience when processing the seemingly complex offer, and 
consequently, attribute the positive experience to perceptions of how well they carried 
themselves during the negotiation. Conversely, gain/loss frames appear simple since 
they take the affirmed form, which does not require additional cognitive effort to 
process. As such, those low in NC might have a more pleasant (or less unpleasant) 
experience processing the simple-to-digest gain/loss frames, and consequently 
develop more positive self-perceptions. 
Hypothesis 3. High-NC negotiators are more likely to feel satisfied with themselves 
when they accept an offer with absence frames (non-gain/non-loss frames) as 
compared to presence frames (gain/loss frames), whereas low-NC negotiators are 
more like to feel satisfied with themselves when they accept an offer with presence 
frames (gain/loss frames) as opposed to absence frames (non-gain/non-loss frames).  
4 Experiment 
4.1 The Design 
A 2x2 between-subject factorial experiment was designed to test our hypotheses. The 
negotiation context was created through an experimental procedure in which 
participants were assigned the role of a buyer who had to undertake an on-line four-
issue negotiation to purchase laptop computers. The four issues were unit price, 
quantity, service level, and delivery terms. Although participants were not explicitly 
told, in fact that the seller was represented by a software agent1 embedded in the 
website. Participants were randomly assigned to different treatment conditions. Figure 
1 presents the experimental design.  
In order to fill all the cells in the design (as shown in Figure 1), ninety-six 
undergraduate students were recruited from a large university. The data of 
participants who did not accept the seller’s final offer (see Table 2) were discarded. 
As a means of encouraging participants to negotiate realistically for a “good deal,” 
participants were told that not only would they receive $10 cash after the experiment, 
but that they would get an additional $10 if they were to achieve a utility score in the 
top 30%.  In fact, all participants ended up with the same offer from the seller agent, 
and all were given an additional $10 after all of the experimental sessions were 
concluded. 
                                                          
1 The software agent system was designed and developed for a research program that explores 
the influence of factors that play an important role in agent-to-human negotiations [1, 40]. 
  
 
Fig. 1. The Experimental Design. Each treatment cell included data from 13 participants who 
accepted the seller agents’ final offer in one of the four framing conditions (gain, non-gain, 
loss, and non-loss).  
4.2 Negotiation Task 
The task was adapted from a validated negotiation scenario based on real-world 
manufacturing contract negotiations originally developed by Jones [41] and used in 
various computer-based negotiation experiments (e.g.,  [25, 27, 28, 40]). Participants 
(buyers) were provided with a private utility table from which they could compute the 
utility of an offer by summing the utilities of each of the four issues in the offer. The 
structure of the task created 728 discrete alternatives to the negotiation agreement 
with utilities ranging from 0 to 100. In order to create a realistic “bottom line” 
condition, both buyers and the seller were given the same bargaining power, namely, 
BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) [42, 43] values that 
represented 44 utility points. Participants were told that they should obtain an 
agreement with as high a utility as possible, but because a reserve agreement already 
existed, there was no point in reaching an agreement with a utility below 45. 
4.3 Independent Variable and Controlled Variables 
There were two levels each of the two independent variables, corresponding to the 
four frames used by the selling agent to present the final offer–an offer which 
participants could either accept or reject. The objective effectiveness (utility) of the 
final offer was the same in all conditions and was designed to be sufficiently 
appealing that most participants could be expected to accept it.  
Table 2 below illustrates how the four frames were presented in the final round of 
agent offers as they correspond to the gain/loss x absence/presence manipulation. 
The negotiation rules were controlled by using the same one-way protocol for all 
conditions. The rule simply stated that the negotiation proceeds in rounds, at each 
round the seller will send an offer for the buyer to either accept or reject. The 
negotiation is completed when the buyer accepts one offer (agreement is achieved) or 
the buyer rejects the seller’s final offer. The same negotiation task was used in all 
conditions. The negotiation website interface was the same for all participants across 
all conditions, and the experiment was administered to all participants by the same 
experimenter using the same standardized instruction script for all sessions. 
                                               Presence-Absence Frame 
  Presence Absence 
Gain gain 
13 participants 
non-gain 
13 participants 
 
Gain-Loss 
Frame Loss loss 
13 participants 
non-loss 
13 participants 
 
 Table 2. Negotiation rounds. Frame manipulation only for final offer (Round 4) 
 Seller’s offer and accompanying message  Utility (from utility table)  
Round 
1  
 
 
 
Chris says:  
Hello! My name is Chris. I am a sales 
manager at LaptopOnDemand. Thank you for 
your interest in our products. For laptop sales, 
we typically require a minimum purchase of 100 
units and we can only ship in units of 20, with an 
average of 2 weeks for delivery. Sometimes, we 
are able to give a discounted price and a service 
upgrade.  
The following offer package comes with 
“Silver” service level. I can give you $2250/unit  
and deliver in 3 weeks, provided that you will 
take 160 units  
 
 
Unit Price: $2250/unit (13) 
Quantity: 160 units (8) 
Service Level: Silver  (15) 
Delivery: 3 weeks  (5) 
 
Total utility: (41) 
 
Round 
2  
 
 
Chris says:  
Okay. I can give you a discount if you order 
more units. If you can take 200 units, I can give 
you them for $2150/unit and delivery in 3 weeks. 
That would be with the “Silver” service level. 
What do you say?  
 
Unit Price: $2150/unit (27) 
Quantity: 200 units (3) 
Service Level: Silver  (15) 
Delivery: 3 weeks  (5) 
 
Total utility: (50) 
Round 
3  
 
 
Chris says:  
Hmmm. Well if you take 200 units and are 
OK with having them shipped a week later, 
i.e., 4 weeks delivery, I can give you an even 
better discount: $2050/unit. The service level 
is the “Silver” one. How does that sound?  
 
 
Unit Price: $2050/unit (39) 
Quantity: 200 units (3) 
Service Level: Silver (15) 
Delivery: 4 weeks (0) 
 
Total utility: (57) 
Round 
4  
 
 
Chris says:  
Okay. How about this? 200 units at 
$2050/unit, and 4 weeks delivery. 
This is the best I can do. However, since it’s a 
large order, I might be able to manage a service 
upgrade, That’s a $2000 per annum value.  
<frames inserted here> What do you say?  
<frame a – gain> OK, so if you accept my 
offer this time, I’ll give you the free service-
upgrade to “Gold”.  
<frame b – non-loss > OK, so if you accept 
my offer this time, I won’t charge you for the 
service-upgrade to “Gold”. 
<frame c – non-gain > OK, but if you don’t 
accept my offer this time, I won’t give you the 
free service-upgrade to “Gold”.  
<frame d – loss > OK, but if you don’t accept 
my offer this time, I’ll charge you for the 
service-upgrade to “Gold”. 
 
 
Unit Price: $2050/unit (39) 
Quantity: 200 units (3) 
Service Level: Gold (29) 
Delivery: 4 weeks  (0) 
 
Total utility: (71) 
 
 4.4 The Dependent Variables and Moderating Variable 
The subjective negotiation outcomes were evaluated using a post-negotiation 
questionnaire. Items were adapted from earlier negotiation experiments (e.g., [26, 27, 
29, 44]) and the 16-item Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) that assesses subjective 
effectiveness [7]. The scales of this inventory are established and have shown good 
psychometric properties. The items for the key dependent variables are presented in 
Appendix A. The moderating variable, Need for Cognition, was assessed using the 
standard NC scale [9] (see Appendix B for sample items). This instrument was 
administered after participants completed the post-negotiation questionnaire.  
4.5 Procedure 
The experiment followed a standard three-stage procedure. In the pre-negotiation 
phase, participants were assigned the role of a purchasing manager for a bogus buyer 
organization known as Tan Brothers Electronics Inc. They were given an information 
sheet describing the task and providing background information on the company, the 
terms of negotiation, and a utility table summarizing the range of possible utilities 
that could be obtained. Participants were not explicitly told the utilities associated 
with each term, but could identify and add the utilities themselves by referring to the 
utility table. The higher the utility score obtained, the higher the overall profitability 
of the negotiated agreement. Participants were reminded that utility scores in the top 
30% would be eligible for a cash bonus. They then completed a pre-negotiation 
questionnaire to ensure that they properly understood the task.   
In the negotiation phase, participants first entered a unique Buyer ID that was later 
used to retrieve their responses to offers from the server log. They then began their 
negotiation with the counterpart. There was no time limit for the negotiation. In each 
negotiation, participants (buyers) encountered up to four negotiation rounds. The first 
three rounds were identical across all conditions. The utility scores associated with 
them were constructed in such a way as to render offer acceptance unlikely. In the last 
round, all participants received offers with the same utility score–a score well above 
their (predefined) bottom lines (see Table 2 above). 
In the post-negotiation phase, after the settlement, participants were asked to 
complete the post-negotiation questionnaire as well as the personality assessment 
items. Participants were then debriefed, given $10 for their participation, and asked to 
keep their experience in the study confidential. The $10 cash bonus awards (in fact 
for all participants) were announced (and in most cases, collected) four weeks later. 
5 Data Analysis and Results 
Before addressing the main hypothesis, we assessed the reliability of the subjective 
negotiation outcome measures. Results showed acceptable values with a Cronbach’s 
alpha greater than 0.7 on all three dimensions–satisfaction with settlement, self, and 
counterpart (see Appendix A). In addition, because we measured NC after the framing 
manipulation, we had to confirm that NC scores were indeed a stable personality 
 difference and thus, not influenced by framing. Indeed, Need for Cognition scores did 
not differ as a function of frame conditions, F (3, 48) = .82, p = .49. 
Three separate regression analyses were conducted with gain-loss frame, absence-
presence frame and NC as predictors, and the subjective effectiveness measure of 
interest as the criterion variable in each analysis. In the first step, gain-loss frame, 
absence-presence frame, and centered NC scores were entered into the model. 
Following which, the interaction terms (i.e., gain-loss x absence-presence, NC x gain-
loss, NC x absence-presence) were entered in the second step.  
The analyses revealed only a 3-way interaction between NC, absence-presence 
frame, and gain-loss frame in satisfaction with the counterpart, B = -.03, t(44) = -
1.80, p = .09. The interaction was decomposed by performing separate regression 
analyses for gain vs. loss frame, in terms of participants with low NC vs. high NC. 
The participants were categorized into those with NC scores one standard deviation 
below and one standard deviation above the mean respectively. Results showed that 
the 3-way interaction tended to be driven by low NCs experiencing less satisfaction 
with the counterpart after they accepted the non-gain frame as opposed to the other 
frames, B = .78, t(48) = 2.04, p = .05. For the high NCs, there were no significant 
differences in their satisfaction with counterpart in terms of efficiency among the four 
frames. 
A similar pattern of result was also found for satisfaction with the settlement, i.e. a 
3-way interaction between NC, absence-presence frame, and gain-loss frame, B = -
.04, t(44) = -2.44, p < .05. When the interaction was decomposed in the same manner, 
results indicated that the interaction again was mainly driven by low NCs 
experiencing less satisfaction with the settlement after they accepted the non-gain 
frame as opposed to the other frames, B = .82, t(48) = 2.29, p < .05. There were also 
no significant differences in the satisfaction with the settlement for the high NCs 
across all frames. 
The regression analysis revealed only a significant 2-way interaction between NC 
and absence-presence frame in satisfaction with the self, B = -.03, t(49) = -2.55, p < 
.05. The interaction was decomposed by performing separate regression analyses for 
participants with high NC versus those with low NC, again categorized by those with 
NC scores one standard deviation above and below the mean respectively. Results 
showed that among those high in NC, feelings about the self were more positive for 
those who accepted offers framed as absences (i.e. non-gain/non-loss) than for those 
who accepted offers framed as the presence of a gain or loss (i.e. gain/loss), B = -.34, 
t(49) = -2.05, p < .05. The reverse was found for participants low in NC, who tended 
to show more positive feelings about the self when they accepted the offer framed as 
the presence of a gain or loss (i.e. gain/loss) than when they accepted the offer framed 
as the absence of a gain or loss (i.e. non-gain/non-loss), B = .29, t(49) = 1.71, p = .09. 
 6 Discussion and Implications 
6.1 Discussion 
Our findings of no main effect indicate that there is no difference between offers 
framed as “promise” (gain/non-loss) versus those framed as “threat” (loss/non-gain) 
frames in any of the three dimensions of the subjective negotiation outcomes. Thus 
the prediction that promise (gain/non-loss) as opposed to threat (loss/non-gain) 
frames result in greater satisfaction with the counterpart (Hypothesis 1) and greater 
satisfaction with the settlement (Hypothesis 2) were not supported. Whether these 
predictions could be confirmed with a more sensitive design remains to be seen. 
However, interestingly, we observed a 3-way interaction among gain-loss, absence-
presence frame, and NC on satisfaction with the counterpart and satisfaction with the 
negotiation settlement. That is, while high-NC negotiators were not affected by 
promise vs. threat, low-NC people tended to have less positive feelings about both the 
settlement and their counterpart (the seller agent) only after they accepted an offer 
presented in a non-gain frame. This suggests that the negative subjective consequence 
of issuing loss/non-gain frames was further coupled with the NC dimension. This may 
be due to the tendency that low-NC people feel less pleasant when they process the 
absence frame (i.e., non-gain). Therefore, between the two threat messages (loss and 
non-gain), the non-gain condition resulted in less positive subjective experience for 
the low-NC participants. Future research is needed to confirm this assertion.  
Whereas Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported, there was support for Hypothesis 
3 as evidenced by the absence/presence frame x NC interaction relative to satisfaction 
with the self. That is, participants high in NC were more satisfied with themselves 
after they accepted a non-gain/non-loss offer than a gain/loss offer, while those low in 
NC showed the opposite pattern. This result parallels the recent finding that perceived 
message complexity can impact processing of information among individuals who 
differ in NC. In particular, those high in NC reported greater motivational arousal and 
were more likely to use their background knowledge to process information, when 
they perceived a message as complex than when they perceived the same message to 
be simple. In contrast, individuals low in NC reported greater arousal and used their 
background knowledge (which was manipulated to be at the same level as the high 
NC individuals) when they perceived the same message as simple rather than when 
they perceived the message as complex [34]. 
6.2 Implications  
The results of this work lend credence to the idea that framing and individual 
differences are worth taking into account in the design of intelligent negotiation 
agents. Our results show that negotiators had different preferences towards the same 
offer presented in different frames, depending on their level of NC. Negotiators high 
in NC felt better about themselves after accepting offers presented with complex non-
gain/non-loss frames, whereas simple gain/loss frames elicited greater positive 
feelings about the self only for negotiators low in NC–a frame matching effect.  
 In the simplest manner, one plausible application of this finding in the context of 
agent-to-human negotiation would be to determine the human negotiators’ level of 
NC prior to the negotiation by including the Need for Cognition Scale as a 
questionnaire that negotiators would complete as part of the procedure to create a user 
profile. Alternatively, designers could look into programming seller agents that could 
detect the human counterpart’s NC by exploiting various behavioral manifestation of 
NC. For example, since high NC is associated with deeper information processing 
than low NC, the time taken for high NC negotiators to process an offer might be 
longer than for those low in NC. As such, real time measures such as the time taken 
for mouse movement during the online negotiation might be used to estimate of depth 
of processing, and thus the negotiator’s level of NC. Agents might also attempt to 
assess NC by monitoring pre-negotiation behaviors such as the type of information 
(simple vs. complex) the human counterparts tend to select in pre-negotiation internet 
surfing. Once the information regarding negotiators’ level of NC is obtained, frame 
matching can be applied by providing negotiators with offers framed in the way that 
matches their NC. 
The advantage of using behavioral manifestations of NC is that they are more 
readily observable in an online setting, where agent-to-human negotiation typically 
takes place. The disadvantage, of course, is that they raise all kinds of difficult-to-
resolve privacy and ethical questions. 
7  Conclusion 
In this paper we introduced a frame x personality perspective on agent-to-human 
negotiation. We demonstrated that unlike the traditional use of gain/loss framing in 
persuasion, which considers only the presence of gains and losses, the inclusion of the 
absence/presence dimension provides another important distinction in terms of the 
negation of gains and losses, that is, non-gains and non-losses. In particular, we 
established that in the context of individual differences in Need for Cognition, the 
traditional simple gain/loss frames fit the preferences of negotiators low in NC, 
whereas the more complex non-gain/non-loss frames fit the preferences of those who 
are high in NC. This interaction between the absence/presence dimension and need 
for cognition was found to impact negotiators’ feelings about themselves, which is an 
important subjective negotiation outcome that can influence future negotiation 
choices. 
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Appendix A:  Sample Items of the Post-Negotiation Questionnaire 
(adapted from [7, 26, 27, 29, 44]) 
 
Dependent Variables and Measurement items Response options 
Satisfaction with the settlement 
1. How satisfied are you with the outcome—i.e., 
the extent to which you expect the terms of your 
agreement (or lack of agreement) to benefit you? 
1 = Not at all, 4 = Moderately, and 7 = 
Perfectly  
2.  How satisfied are you with the number of 
utility points you earned? 
1 =  Extremely dissatisfied , 4 = 
Indifferent, and 7 =  Extremely 
satisfied  
3. What do you think of the agreement? 1 =  Much worse than I had hoped for , 
4 =  As expected , and 7 =  Much 
better than I had hoped for  
Satisfaction with the self 
1. Did you “lose face” (i.e., damage your sense of 
pride) in the negotiation? (Reverse coded) 
1 = Not at all, 4 = Moderately, and 7 = 
A great deal; N.A. 
2. Did this negotiation make you feel more or less 
competent as a negotiator? 
1 = It made me feel less competent, 4 = 
It did not make me feel more or less 
competent, and 7 = It made me feel 
more competent;  
3. Did you behave according to your own 
principles and values? 
1 = Not at all, 4 = Moderately, and 7 = 
Perfectly;  N.A. 
4. Did this negotiation positively or negatively 
impact your self-image or your impression of 
yourself? 
1 = It negatively impacted my self-
image, 4 = It did not positively or 
negatively impact my self-image, and 
7 = It positively impacted my self-
image; N.A. 
Satisfaction with the counterpart 
1. Do you feel the seller listened to your concerns? 1 = Not at all, 4 = Moderately, and 7 = 
Perfectly; N.A. 
2. How satisfied are you with the ease (or 
difficulty) of reaching an agreement? 
1 = Not at all satisfied, 4 = Moderately 
satisfied, and 7 = Perfectly satisfied  
3. To what extent do you think the seller cared 
about your feelings? 
1 = Not at all, 4 = Moderately, and 7 = 
Very much 
4. To what extent do you think the seller cared 
about your interests and concerns? 
1 = Not at all, 4 = Moderately, and 7 = 
Very much 
 Appendix B: Sample Items of the Need for Cognition Scale [9] 
Statements Response options 
I prefer complex to simple problems.   1 = Extremely uncharacteristic, 3 = 
Uncertain, 5 = Extremely characteristic 
I would rather do something that requires little 
thought than something that is sure to challenge 
my abilities. 
1 = Extremely uncharacteristic, 3 = 
Uncertain, 5 = Extremely characteristic 
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long 
hours. 
1 = Extremely uncharacteristic, 3 = 
Uncertain, 5 = Extremely characteristic 
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with 
new solutions to problems. 
1 = Extremely uncharacteristic, 3 = 
Uncertain, 5 = Extremely characteristic 
Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me 
much. 
1 = Extremely uncharacteristic, 3 = 
Uncertain, 5 = Extremely characteristic 
It's enough for me that something gets the job 
done; I don't care how or why it works. 
1 = Extremely uncharacteristic, 3 = 
Uncertain, 5 = Extremely characteristic 
 
 
